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CONGRESS CAN’T TRADE
AMERICA’S “AIR”: COPYRIGHT,
THE “KINDRED SUBJECT OF
PATENT”
1

MICHAEL P. GOODMAN, PH.D.*

INTRODUCTION

W

hen Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(“URAA”) in 1994,2 it allowed foreign companies, for the
first time,3 to copyright work from the public domain.4 In doing so,
Congress undeniably restrained the air that Justice Brandeis
proclaimed free when he declared, “The general rule of law is, that the
noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use.”5 By passing the URAA, just
over 200 years after the United States declared independence from
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1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
2. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. 4809,
4976–81 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A).
3. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119,
1179 (2000).
4. First Amended Complaint at 3, Golan v. Gonzales, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo.
2004) (No. 01-B-1854) (“Section 514 of the URAA mandates a ‘wholesale removal of vast
amounts of existing works—thousands of books, paintings, drawings, music, films, photographs,
and other artistic works—from the public domain.’”). The URAA and its advocates describe
this as “restoring” copyright. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. at
4976–81. See also S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 10 (1994) (“The copyright subtitle . . . restores
copyright protection to works already in the public domain in the United States but still under
protection in a WTO Member that is the source of the work.”). However, as every affected
work has a U.S. copyright for the first time through passage of the URAA, this appears to be a
mere semantic avoidance of the more accurate description that the URAA “secures” copyright
in these works. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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England, Congress has taken an unprecedented step toward bringing
U.S. copyright law back into line with the laws of England, mainland
Europe, and the rest of the international community.6 Congress
7
passed the Act in order to meet international trade obligations with
its supporters proclaiming, “The Uruguay round is the most
comprehensive trade agreement in history” and an “unprecedented
opportunity to benefit the United States, create new high-paying jobs,
and strengthen our economy.”8
The general problem with trying to force international law onto
our constitutional system is particularly apparent in the copyright
context, because this is an area in which the disparity between the
prevailing view of the world community and the American view is
9
especially large. For example, whereas the American perspective is
that copyright is a means of providing an inducement for authors to
create new works in order to achieve a greater purpose,10 the majority
of the world views copyright as an end in its own right, based on
11
granting authors “moral rights” to exert control over their work.
In The End of Copyright, David Nimmer describes the passage of
the URAA as representing “the first tremors of certain tectonic shifts
in United States sovereignty” that call into question “the identity of
12
the master in the copyright sphere.” Professor Nimmer suggests
that, in passing the URAA, Congress created a dramatic clash

6. See infra Part I.
For a general discussion of the increasing trend toward
internationalization of copyright, see Richard B. Graves III, Globalization, Treaty Powers, and
the Limits of the Intellectual Property Clause, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 199 (2003).
7. The URAA is entitled, “An Act to approve and implement the trade agreements
concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.” Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. at 4976–81. See also Doris E. Long, Copyright and
the Uruguay Round Agreements: A New Era of Protection or an Illusory Promise?, 22 AIPLA
Q.J. 531, 565 (1995).
8. 140 CONG. REC. S15271-03, at S15278 (Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Cochran).
9. See Long, supra note 7, at 533 (referring to some of the disagreements regarding
copyright policy as entailing “diametrically opposed views”).
10. E.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (“The enactment of
copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any
natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to
authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”).
11. Doris Long notes that, during debate on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
“[a]mong the developed countries that submitted drafts, the United States was the only one
which sought to exclude moral rights.” Long, supra note 7, at 552.
12. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1385–86 (1995).
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between international trade law and the United States Constitution,13
a fray into which courts have only begun to tread.14 To meet our
international obligations, Congress ignored the Constitution,
15
specifically the Patent and Copyright Clause. Professor Nimmer
fears that trade law will win this clash, as “all legal doctrines are
collapsing into the gigantic crunch of trade law.”16
In this Essay, I describe how the Patent and Copyright Clause17
insists that Congress cannot so readily trade America’s “air.” In Part I
of this Essay, I briefly discuss section 514 of the URAA, in which
Congress granted foreign authors copyright to works in the public
domain, and I review two recent challenges to this section under the
Patent and Copyright Clause. In Part II, I analyze why the URAA
must be subject to the limitations of the Patent and Copyright Clause.
In Part III, I describe two reasons why this Clause dictates that
section 514 is unconstitutional. First, I briefly explore how section 514
unconstitutionally grants copyrights to entities other than “authors.”18
Then, I explain why the rule from Graham v. John Deere Co.,19 which
states that patents may not be secured for works in the public domain,
20
applies with equal force to copyright.
I. SECTION 514 OF THE URAA AND
CHALLENGES TO ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
Congress enacted the URAA in order to comply with the United
21
States’ obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization.
13. Id. at 1386.
14. See infra Part I.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 1387.
17. Commentators usually describe Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 in its entirety as “the
Intellectual Property Clause,” see, e.g., Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 367 (2000), although “the Patent and Copyright Clause” or the
“Progress Clause” are also common, see, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual
Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property
Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1772–73 n.1 (2006). The words of the Clause relevant to patents are
often described as “the Patent Clause” and those relevant to copyright as “the Copyright
Clause.” Id. For the sake of convenience, I will refer throughout this essay to the Clause as
“the Patent and Copyright Clause.”
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See infra Part III.A.
19. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
20. See infra Part III.B.2.
21. See, e.g., David E. Shipley, What Do Flexible Road Signs, Children’s Clothes and the
Allied Campaign in Europe During WWII Have in Common? The Public Domain and the
Supreme Court’s Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 98–99
(2005).
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The United States became a member of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works22 in 1988.23 Article 18 of the
Convention “requires that the terms of the Convention apply to all
works that have fallen into the public domain for reasons other than
expiration of their term of copyright.”24 The Berne Convention is not
self-executing, however, and the United States never passed
25
During 1993 and 1994,
legislation implementing Article 18.
following over seven years of world trade talks, 111 countries drafted
and signed the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
26
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). The
United States is a signatory member of GATT, including the
associated Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
27
Property Rights (“TRIPS”). Congress passed the URAA in 1994 to
implement these agreements into U.S. law.28
Section 514 of the URAA automatically grants copyright
protection to foreign copyright holders whose works are protected in
their own country, but which are in the public domain in the United
29
States, for three separate reasons. First, the URAA grants copyright
to works if the foreign copyright owner failed to comply with U.S.
30
copyright formalities. Second, a copyright is granted if the subject
matter was not previously, but now is, copyrightable in the United
31
States, such as sound recordings recorded before 1972. Finally, a
foreign work is granted a U.S. copyright if the United States had
previously failed to recognize copyrights from the owner’s home
country.32

21. See Long, supra note 7, at 572–73.
22. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1974, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, 275, 277.
23. Edward C. Walterscheid, Understanding the Copyright Act of 1790: The Issue of
Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretation of the Copyright Power, 53
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 353 n.46 (2006).
24. Long, supra note 7, at 571.
25. S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d
Cir. 1995). See also Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153
(1998) (“Equally irrelevant is the fact that the Executive Branch of the Government has entered
into at least five international trade agreements . . . none has been ratified by the Senate.”).
26. Long, supra note 7, at 533.
27. Id.
28. Shipley, supra note 21, at 98–99.
29. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat.
4809, 4980–81 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225–26 (1994).
30. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. at 4980–81.
31. See Long, supra note 7, at 572–73.
32. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. at 4980–81.
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Since the URAA was first passed, critics have raised serious
questions about the constitutionality of section 514.33 Two cases
challenging this section as unconstitutional under the Patent and
Copyright Clause have thus far reached the federal circuit courts of
appeals, Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft34 and Golan v.
Gonzales.35
In Luck’s Music Library, a “family-owned, corporation that
repackage[d] and [sold] works already in the public domain,” joined
Moviecraft, a business that preserved films that were already in the
public domain, to argue that the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution “requires the public to have free access to copy and use
works once they have fallen into the public domain.”36 In Golan v.
Gonzales, another group of “artists or purveyors of art material” also
challenged the constitutionality of section 514. They proposed that
once a work goes into the public domain the Patent and Copyright
Clause prohibits Congress from removing it from free use.37
In both cases, the district courts that first considered these issues
rejected the notion that Congress lacks authority to pass section 514

33. This Essay only explores the constitutionality of section 514 under the Patent and
Copyright Clause, but section 514 has also been challenged as violating the First Amendment in
the same cases discussed within this section. E.g., Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220
(D. Colo. 2004), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th
Cir. 2007). With respect to whether it violates the Takings Clause, Due Process, and Equal
Protection, see generally Thomas Gordon Kennedy, GATT-out of the Public Domain:
Constitutional Dimensions of Foreign Copyright Restoration, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 545 (1996). Section 514 is not the only part of the URAA to face constitutional
challenges. In addition, sections 512 (17 U.S.C. § 1101) and 513 (18 U.S.C. § 2319A), antibootlegging statutes that establish civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for recording and
trafficking copies of live musical performances, have been challenged as unconstitutional under
both the Patent and Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. United States v. Moghadam,
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (Patent and Copyright Clause); United States v. Martignon, 346
F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) (Patent and Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment). See also Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws
in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s
Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661 (2002).
34. 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
35. 501 F.3d 1179.
36. Luck’s Music Library v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d,
407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also Amanda Roach, Case Summary, Luck’s Music Library
v. Ashcroft 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (2004), 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 421 (2005).
37. Plaintiffs combined this challenge with an argument that the Copyright Term Extension
Act was unconstitutional, which the District Court held was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Eldred v. Gonzales, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1216–
18.
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under the Patent and Copyright Clause.38 When considering Luck’s
challenge, the District Court for the District of Columbia relied on the
Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]o comprehend the scope of
Congress’ power under the IP clause, ‘a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.’”39 The Court reviewed the history of copyright law40
and concluded that “Congress’ past actions show a clear history of
allowing retroactive copyrights, lending significant weight” to the
argument that section 514 is constitutional.41 In Golan, the District
Court for Colorado also considered Congress’ historical treatment of
42
copyright. Finding that “[o]n the whole, Congress has historically
demonstrated little compunction about removing copyrightable
materials from the public domain,” the court held that Congress acted
43
within its authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause.
In their respective reviews of the historical treatment of copyright,
both district courts relied on an understanding that the very first
Copyright Act, passed in 1790, demonstrates that “[t]he First Congress
evidently determined that [removing works from the public domain]
44
In an essay critical of the
was constitutionally permissible.”
reasoning in both of these cases, Edward Waltersheid notes that these
two courts maintained a flawed understanding of copyright’s history
in reliance on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Copyright
45
Disapproving of the courts’
Act of 1790 in Wheaton v. Peters.
reliance on a judicial opinion concerning that statute rather than on
the original copyright statute itself, Waltersheid opines, “Reliance on
judicial legerdemain in interpreting the 1790 Copyright Act is a frail
reed on which to predicate the copyright power of Congress.”46 After
reviewing the historical treatment of copyright, he concludes that “a
basic premise used by courts in the past several years to justify the
constitutionality of . . . Section 514 of the URAA is suspect at best.”47
38. Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 112; Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *14 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part,
501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
39. Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200) (internal
brackets omitted).
40. Id. at 113–16.
41. Id. at 116.
42. Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754, at *5–14.
43. Id. at *14.
44. Id. at *11. See also Luck’s Music Library, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
45. Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 353 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591
(1834)).
46. Id. at 353 (footnote omitted).
47. Id.
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I will not attempt to resolve whether this historical understanding is
flawed, except to recall the fact that “no one acquires a vested or
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when
48
that span of time covers our entire national existence.”
Thus,
regardless of whether Congress historically believed that it could
remove work from the public domain, this issue is not determinative
of the larger question: whether such an action is prohibited by the
Constitution.
With respect to congressional authority to pass section 514, the
district court in Golan reasoned, “[T]hat the public domain is indeed
public does not mandate that the threshold across which works pass
49
into it cannot be traversed in both directions.” The district court in
Golan was also particularly forthright in its opinion regarding the
applicability of patent doctrine to copyright. According to that court’s
view,
Removal of existent knowledge from the public domain is a
persistent danger in the expansion of patent monopolies and, for
that reason, informs courts’ understanding of Congress’ patent
power to a considerable degree. That danger, however, is not
lurking within the retroactive expansion of copyrights . . . . It is
unlikely that the public has a greater interest in copyrightable
50
works than it does in patentable ones.

The district court in Luck’s Music Library agreed that a constitutional
prohibition on Congress with respect to patents is “inapplicable” to
51
copyright. In Golan, the district court built upon this basic attempt
to distinguish copyrights from patents to further assert, “[E]xpansion
of the copyright does not impede the progress of science and the
useful arts to the extent that expansion of the patent might.”52
When the plaintiffs in Luck’s Music Library appealed their case to
the D.C. Circuit, they fared no better than they had at the district
53
level. After hearing the appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
court’s view that the Patent and Copyright Clause does not prohibit
48. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
49. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 20,
2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
50. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
51. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 116–17 (D.D.C. 2004) aff’d
sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This
prohibition is discussed infra Part III.B.1.
52. Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 914754, at *12.
53. Luck’s Music Library, 407 F.3d at 1262.
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Congress from removing works from the public domain.54 Relying on
an understanding of Eldred v. Ashcroft55 as holding that Congress
need have only a rational basis in order to pass copyright legislation,
the D.C. Circuit stressed the trade implications of the URAA, quoting
a U.S. Senate report that stated that “[section 514] helped secure
better foreign protection for U.S. intellectual property and was ‘a
significant opportunity to reduce the impact of copyright piracy on
our world trade position.’”56 Relying on a substantially similar
understanding of the history of copyright as that expressed by the
57
district courts, the D.C. Circuit also disposed of the argument that
patent law’s prohibition applies to copyright, noting, “[T]he case dealt
with patents rather than copyright, and ideas applicable to one don’t
58
automatically apply to the other.” The court further distinguished
patent from copyright because, unlike inventors of patents, an “author
is eager to disclose her work.”59
In support of the government’s position in Golan’s appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, amici crafted an argument distinct from that relied
upon by the government or the lower court.60 Amici proposed that
any discussion of whether the Patent and Copyright Clause would
authorize Congress to pass section 514 is irrelevant to a consideration
of whether section 514 is constitutional, as Congress can, in the
alternative, pass the statute under the Commerce Clause or the Treaty
Power.61
Before addressing this paper’s thesis that both district courts and
the D.C. Circuit erred by refusing to apply patent doctrine to
copyright, I first respond to amici’s argument. I describe why
limitations of the Patent and Copyright Clause must apply to
congressional acts, regardless of the power under which they are
invoked.

54. Id. at 1263.
55. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
56. Luck’s Music Library, 407 F.3d at 1264 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2 (1988)).
57. Id. at 1265–66.
58. Id. at 1266.
59. Id.
60. Brief for The International Coalition for Copyright Protection as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
61. Id at 1182–84.
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II. CONGRESS MAY NOT SIDESTEP THE PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE BY INVOKING ANOTHER ARTICLE I POWER
The Patent and Copyright Clause is “both a grant of power and a
limitation.”62 While it is clear that, under this Clause, Congress has
“broad” power,63 and that Congress may “implement the stated
purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment
64
best effectuates the constitutional aim,” it is equally apparent that
this power is not unlimited. As the Supreme Court has cautioned,
“The clause thus describes both the objective which Congress may
seek and the means to achieve it.”65 In Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court referred with approval to
Congress’ own declaration of a check upon its copyright power: “In
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . how much will
the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”66 Some
commentators have suggested that the patent and copyright “power
of Congress was enumerated in the Constitution for the purpose of
expressing its limitations.”67 Still, to say that the Patent and Copyright
Clause provides an important limitation on the power of Congress
does not specifically delineate the boundaries of those limits.
Nonetheless, over the years the Court has made clear that the outer
limit of Congress’ discretion is bounded in a number of ways,
including by the meanings of “limited times,”68 “author,”69 and
“inventor.”70
Commentators have also described additional
limitations “of constitutional weight” derived from the Patent and
71
Copyright Clause as a whole.
62. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
63. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973) (“[T]he area in which Congress
may act is broad . . . .”).
64. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
65. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555.
66. 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
67. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1153 (quoting 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1953)). See also Graves III, supra note 6, at 204.
68. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–200 (2003).
69. See infra Part III.A.
70. See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 400 (1926)
(“[O]ne really must be the first inventor in order to be entitled to a patent.”). Many
commentators have also explained that a “fixation” requirement is inherent in the meaning of
the term “Writings.” See infra note 90.
71. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1167 (describing four such limitations). The existence
of limitations in the Patent and Copyright Clause does not, of course, suggest that all
congressional acts should be subject to review relating to the limits of the Patent and Copyright
Clause. As they explained, the limits of the Clause must be applied only to “legislation that
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To bypass these limitations, some courts and commentators have
proposed that any inherent limitations on congressional authority
found within the Patent and Copyright Clause do not apply to
72
statutes passed under another constitutional authority. However,
recent scholarship has begun to point to flaws in the logic behind this
notion.73 I join these commentators in arguing that the limitations of
the Patent and Copyright Clause prohibit the removal of work from
the public domain, as the Court explicitly maintained in Graham v.
John Deere Co.,74 notwithstanding any other constitutional authority.
It is well established that “the constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise.”75 In addition, the Supreme Court has
explicitly stated that a grant of power by one constitutional clause
does not shield congressional action under that clause from the
requirement that it meet with other express limitations of the

imposes monopoly-like costs on the public through the granting of exclusive rights.” Id. at 1160
(emphasis omitted).
72. In United States v. Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of
section 513 of the URAA, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). While explicitly
declining to decide whether this section violates the “Limited Times” limitation, id. at 1281, the
court held that it does not violate a “fixation” requirement, id. at 1282, derived from the term
“Writings” in the Patent and Copyright Clause, id. at 1280, and suggested that Congress could
pass the provision under the Commerce Clause despite this limitation, id. at 1277–80. See also
Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after
Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 369 (1992); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and
Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1992); Dennis S. Karjala,
Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 897 n.48 (1992) (“Assuming that
publication places a work in commerce, Congress has this power unless the patent and copyright
clause implies a limitation on the Commerce Clause . . . . [I]t seems unlikely that an original
intent reading of the Constitution would require such an interpretation.”). Congress also
appears to have subscribed to this view. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1120 (“Despite
the limiting language of the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress has recently enacted, or is
seriously contemplating enacting, more than a dozen laws that seem to ignore or purport to
avoid it.”). See also Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature)
Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 596 (1996) (“Sooner or later, and more likely sooner than later, one will
see legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress to restore protection for domestic works now in
the public domain . . . .”).
73. Merschman, supra note 33, at 683–92; Adam R. Tarosky, The Constitutionality of
WIPO’s Broadcasting Treaty: The Originality and Limited Times Requirements of the Copyright
Clause, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16 (2006).
74. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
75. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (quoting Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S.
138, 144 (1948)).
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Constitution.76 The most prominent example of this principle is seen
in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.77 In that case, the
Court struck down a congressional act passed under the Commerce
Clause because the act violated a limitation of the Bankruptcy Clause
that laws be “uniform” throughout the states.78 As the Court
explained, “[I]f we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we
would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”79 As recently as 1999, the Court
reiterated this principle:
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress broad power to
legislate in certain areas. Those legislative powers are, however,
limited not only by the scope of the Framers’ affirmative
delegation, but also by the principle that they may not be exercised
in a way that violates other specific provisions of the
80
Constitution.

Despite the implication of these lessons to copyright, various
courts and commentators have contended that the Commerce Clause
81
may be used to bypass the Patent and Copyright Clause, largely in
reliance on a misreading of the Trade-Mark Cases.82 Though the
Supreme Court’s explicit holding in that case was only that Congress
could not implement federal trademark legislation under authority of
the Patent and Copyright Clause,83 the case has also been read as
granting Congress tacit approval to pass such legislation under the
Commerce Clause. Such a reading is found in United States v.
Moghadam, in which the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[T]he Trade-Mark
Cases stands for the proposition that legislation which would not be
permitted under the Copyright Clause could nonetheless be
permitted under the Commerce Clause, provided that the

76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (“Congress has plenary authority in all areas in
which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not
offend some other constitutional restriction.”) (internal citation omitted).
77. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 468–69.
80. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (internal quotation omitted).
81. See supra note 72. See generally Nimmer, supra note 12 (pointing out that expanded
use by Congress of the Commerce Clause, in particular, has gone beyond the limitations of the
Copyright Clause).
82. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
83. Id. at 94.
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independent requirements of the latter are met.”84 However, to say
that Congress may look to their other enumerated powers to enact
legislation not permitted by one Clause is not to say that Congress
may do the same when an act is prohibited by another Clause.
This distinction became expressly clear when the Court again had
the opportunity to consider federal trademark legislation in Dastar
85
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. In Dastar, the Court
considered an aspect of the federal trademark statute, the Lanham
Act, which, under one reading, would impermissibly violate the Patent
86
and Copyright Clause. In construing the Lanham Act so that it
would not conflict with the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Court
noted that “[t]o hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a)
[of the Lanham Act] created a species of perpetual patent and
copyright, which Congress may not do.”87 Thus, the Court made clear
that even with respect to trademark legislation expressly passed
under the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot violate the limitations
of the Patent and Copyright Clause.
In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly recognized this
distinction when it documented a line of cases in which the Supreme
Court prohibited the Commerce Clause from being used to
88
circumvent limitations of other clauses. Describing Railway Labor
Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons as representing “the Framers’ judgment
that Congress should be affirmatively prohibited from passing certain
types of legislation, no matter under which provision,”89 the
Moghadam court ruled that Congress could bypass the Patent and
Copyright Clause because “the Copyright Clause does not envision
that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-like
protection under other constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce
Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the fixation
requirement inherent in the term ‘Writings.’”90 With respect to a
limitation of the Patent and Copyright Clause, however, the court
84. 175 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999).
85. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 37.
88. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279–81 (11th Cir. 1999).
89. Id. at 1279.
90. Id. at 1280. Some commentators disagree with the Moghadam court’s view that
fixation is not a requirement of the Patent and Copyright Clause. E.g., Merschman, supra note
33, at 678–83. See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“‘[W]ritings’ . . . may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor.”) (emphasis added). I do not here attempt to fully explore or resolve this debate.
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stated, “[w]e assume arguendo, without deciding, that the Commerce
Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright
Clause if the particular use of the Commerce Clause . . . were
fundamentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in the
Copyright Clause . . . .”91 Thus, even under the Eleventh Circuit’s
reading, when the Patent and Copyright Clause “positively forbids”
legislation, Congress may not bypass this limitation under the
Commerce Clause.92 The Eleventh Circuit also clearly recognized that
other limitations from the Patent and Copyright Clause do reach this
93
same level of an absolute prohibition on Congress.
Commentators have similarly suggested that the treaty power
independently grants Congress special authority, which may be used
94
to bypass any limitations of the Patent and Copyright Clause. These
arguments rely on the Supreme Court’s dicta in the Trade-Mark
Cases, stating that “we wish to be understood as leaving untouched
the whole question of the treaty-making power over trade-marks, and
of the duty of Congress to pass any laws necessary to carry treaties
into effect.”95 The arguments also rely on Missouri v. Holland, which
stands for the proposition that Congress has broad authority under its
96
treaty power beyond the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8.
However, Holland also recognized that “a treaty cannot be valid if it
infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the
treaty-making power . . . ,” and the court only found the treaty at issue
to be within Congress’ powers after finding that “[t]he treaty in
question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in
the Constitution.”97 Moreover, the URAA is not a treaty, of course,

91. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280 n.12.
92. Id. at 1280.
93. See id. at 1281 (leaving undecided the question of whether the “Limited Times”
requirement would render section 513 of the URAA unconstitutional). In United States v.
Martignon, the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York held that section 513 is
an unconstitutional application of the copyright power, both because it violates the “Limited
Times” requirement and because it violates a “fixation” requirement. 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). That court recognized that a holding that this section of the URAA is
unconstitutional need not be in conflict with the Moghadam court’s ruling, if the challenged
feature of a copyright statute is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the “limitations imposed by
the Copyright Clause.” Id. at 428.
94. See, e.g., Jaszi, supra note 72; Caroline T. Nguyen, Expansive Copyright Protection for
All Time? Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1079 (2006).
95. 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879).
96. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
97. Id. at 432, 433.
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but rather a statute implemented like any other.98 The commentators
who propose using the Treaty Power to bypass the Patent and
Copyright Clause’s limitations generally also recognize that “the
Treaty Power may . . . not be used to violate affirmative
prohibitions.”99 Just as under authority of the Commerce Clause, the
Treaty Power is limited by certain absolute prohibitions on
100
congressional power. Thus, even among those commentators most
inclined to view congressional authority broadly, there is general
agreement that a true prohibition found in one part of the
Constitution applies to any congressional action. The next section
describes two such limitations.
III. THE URAA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
A. Congress may not Grant Copyright to Entities Other than
“Authors”
In addition to the more commonly discussed limitations of the
Patent and Copyright Clause,101 the Clause also contains a specific
limitation that Congress may secure copyrights only in “Authors.”
The Supreme Court has defined an “author” as “he to whom anything
owes its orign [sic].”102 As the Court recently explained, “The Framers
guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power in
booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights

98. See Merschman, supra note 33, at 688 n.146; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 1397–98.
99. Nguyen, supra note 94, at 1079.
100. Joseph C. Merschman has previously detailed why Congress may not bypass the Patent
and Copyright Clause by invoking either the Commerce Clause or Trade Power authority.
Merschman, supra note 33, at 683–92. See also William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine
and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359,
361 (1999) (“When a specific clause of the Constitution, such as Clause 8 of Article I, Section 8,
has been construed as containing general limitations on Congress’s power, Congress may not
avoid those limitations by legislating under another clause.”); Malla Pollack, The Right to
Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual
Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 60 (1999)
(“Congress may not do an end run around a limitation in one clause of the Constitution by
invoking a more general clause . . . .”). After conducting a review of many of the reasons
previously advanced for why the Supreme Court should not allow Congress to bypass the Patent
and Copyright Clause’s limitations, Richard Graves concludes that the ideological makeup of
the current Court is unlikely to permit such a bypass. See generally Graves III, supra note 6.
101. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
102. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (citation omitted).
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only in ‘Authors.’”103 Nonetheless, section 514 allows entities that hold
foreign copyrights to obtain a U.S. copyright regardless of whether or
not they are actually authors. A recent case in the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Alameda Films SA de CV v. Authors Rights Restoration
Corp., illustrates the application of the URAA in practice.104
In Alameda Films, twenty-four Mexican film production
companies brought suit against companies that were distributing
various Mexican films in the United States that were originally
105
produced between the late-1930s and the mid-1950s. The Mexican
film companies argued that, though these works had previously fallen
into the public domain in the United States, the URAA granted them
copyrights in the work. They also argued that copyright “‘vests
initially in the author or initial rightholder of the work as determined
by the law of the source country of the work.’”106 As the Fifth Circuit
explained, “[T]he Plaintiffs can claim restored copyrights in their films
under the URAA only if the Plaintiffs are considered ‘authors’ under
Mexican copyright law—the law of the source country of the work.”107
The question of whether the Mexican film companies could be
granted copyrights in their work under the URAA then depended not
on whether they qualified as “Authors,” as envisioned by the
Constitution, but rather on whether they qualified as “authors,” under
Mexican law.108 Clearly, the question of what is required to be an
author in any sovereign nation need have no relationship to the
standard of “Author” required by the U.S. Constitution. Therefore,
whenever a foreign entity which would not meet the Constitution’s
standard attempts to secure copyright under the URAA, a challenge
to the constitutionality of section 514 should be brought and should
be successful.

103. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 n.5 (2003). Because of this limitation, some
commentators have argued that the work-for-hire doctrine of copyright is unconstitutional.
E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 590, 600 (1987). Others, however, disagree with this conclusion. E.g., Heald &
Sherry, supra note 3, at 1190–91.
104. 331 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 475.
106. Id. at 476 n.5 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 104A(2)(b) (2007)).
107. Alameda Films, 331 F.3d at 477.
108. See id. at 477–78.
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B. Congress may not Remove Works from the Public Domain
1. The Graham Rule—Congress May Not Grant Patents To
Works In The Public Domain—One additional, specific limitation
that the Supreme Court has recognized is that Congress may not
109
In Graham v. John Deere
remove work from the public domain.
Co., the Supreme Court explicitly pronounced that “Congress may
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
110
While this statement is often
to materials already available.”
111
derided as “a dictum,” lower courts are “bound by Supreme Court
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings.”112
Furthermore, the conclusion that Congress may not remove works
from the public domain was built upon a substantial foundation of
cases, which held that individual authors and the states are similarly
precluded, and has been reaffirmed.
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., Justice Stevens, writing for a
unanimous Court, explained that the Court’s previous holdings, which
prohibited an inventor from removing works from the public domain,
113
were based on the Constitution. After discussing patent’s role, “as
contemplated by the Constitution,”114 he noted that “the Patent Act
serves as a limiting provision, . . . excluding ideas that are in the public
115
domain from patent protection.” He further explained, “The patent
laws . . . seek . . . to protect the public’s right to retain knowledge

109. By “public domain” I am referring to a concept akin to a definition offered by Yochai
Benkler: “The public domain is the range of uses of information that any person is privileged to
make absent individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular person
unprivileged.” Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 362 (1999). Heald & Sherry
describe this limitation as the “public domain principle.” Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at
1165–66.
110. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
111. E.g., Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
112. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
113. 525 U.S. 55, 64–65 (1998). Justice Stevens specifically discussed only the holding in
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829), but his analysis applies equally to additional
patent cases including, for example, Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858)
(“Moreover, that which is once given to or is invested in the public, cannot be recalled nor taken
from them.”), and Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 323 (1833) (“Whatever may be the
intention of the inventor, if he suffers his invention to go into public use, through any means
whatsoever, without an immediate assertion of his right, he is not entitled to a patent.”).
114. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64 (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533–34
(1870)).
115. Id.
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already in the public domain.”116 The Federal Circuit has further
recognized that one of the purposes of patent’s public-use bar to
patentability is “discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of
inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely
available.”117 Thus, undoubtedly the Constitution prohibits individuals
from removing works from the public domain through patents.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the states are similarly
prohibited from removing work from the public domain, and the
Court has affirmed that this limitation derives from the Patent and
Copyright Clause. In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., the
Court noted that “[t]o forbid copying would interfere with the federal
policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution . . . of allowing free
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in
the public domain.”118 The Court based this assertion on its holding in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., which recognized only that states
119
may not enact measures inconsistent with federal patent laws. Thus,
one interpretation is that the Clause is intended only to describe a
limitation, rooted in the Supremacy Clause, that the states cannot
grant patents and copyrights beyond those established by Congress.120
This explanation would mean that the Court’s recognition that the
“policy of the patent law: that which is in the public domain cannot be
removed therefrom by action of the States”121 must be based
exclusively on the Supremacy Clause.
However, this reading would ignore Compco’s explicit reference
to the Patent and Copyright Clause as establishing a policy of leaving
the public domain untouched, as well as the fact that Compco never
122
Since Compco’s
even mentioned the Supremacy Clause.
admonition that works in the public domain must remain there was
explicitly based on the Patent and Copyright Clause, it necessarily
applies to Congressional actions. In Goldstein v. California, the Court
explicitly made this very point, noting that “Section 8 enumerates

116. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
117. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc. 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
118. 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
119. 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964).
120. In fact, the Court has clearly stated that Sears itself was rooted in the Supremacy
Clause. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 n.8. (2003).
121. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
122. See Theodore H. Davis Jr., Copying In The Shadow Of The Constitution: The Rational
Limits Of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 610–13 (1996); Shipley, supra note 21,
at 59–65.
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those powers which have been granted to Congress; Whatever
limitations have been appended to such powers can only be
understood as a limit on congressional . . . action.”123 In Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court referred to “[t]he policy that matter
124
once in the public domain must remain in the public domain,” and
in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Court reaffirmed
125
The inevitable conclusion from these cases is that the
this rule.”
Court meant what it said in Graham, and that the prohibition on
issuing patents to work in the public domain applies to Congress as
well as the states. As the Court put it, “[W]e have consistently
reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once placed
before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject
to appropriation without significant restraint.”126
By passing section 514 of the URAA, Congress exceeded the
boundaries established by Graham, but it has done so in the copyright
rather than the patent context. The district court in Golan v. Gonzales
wrote that “[i]t is unlikely that the public has a greater interest in
copyrightable works than it does in patentable ones,” thus refusing to
rely on patent cases and concluding that Congress is not precluded
127
from taking copyrighted works from the public domain. This notion
of the public’s alleged “greater interest” in patent is reminiscent of
judicial notions that elicited Justice Holmes’ famous reminder that
“[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”128 A
blanket conclusion that the works protected by patent are more
important to the public than those of copyright is just as unwarranted
as a proclamation that a single work is more worthy than another
within the field of copyright. Who can say that the next Shakespeare
or Monet is any less important for society, or worthy of protection,
than the next patent issued for a computer or better mousetrap? A
blanket statement in favor of patents over copyrights seems

123. 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).
124. 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
125. 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185
(1896) (clarifying that when an invention enters the public domain “the right to make the thing
formerly covered by the patent becomes public property”)).
126. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156.
127. No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), aff’d in part,
remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
128. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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particularly questionable when one considers design patents, which
may issue for works that are often also copyrightable,129 and serve
much the same purpose.130
Previous courts and commentators have had the opportunity to
explore the application of the Graham rule to Congress’ authority
with respect to copyrights. Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, in an
interesting analysis, considered the application of this limitation, as
well as others implied by the Patent and Copyright Clause, to two
federal copyright statutes, the Copyright Term Extension Act
(“CTEA”)131 and the URAA.132 While they suggested that the URAA
“may be subject to challenge under either the Public Domain
Principle or the Quid Pro Quo Principle,” they ultimately concluded
133
that “only the Quid Pro Quo Principle presents serious problems.”
Although recognizing that the URAA “takes some works out of the
public domain,” Heald and Sherry concluded that this was permissible
based on their description of this taking as only an “administrative
technicalit[y].”134 On the other hand, they concluded that application
of the Quid Pro Quo principle rendered both the CTEA and URAA
135
unconstitutional.
These ideas were tested by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Eldred v. Reno, when that court considered the constitutionality of
136
the CTEA. Although the D.C. Circuit rejected Heald and Sherry’s
conclusion that the CTEA is unconstitutional, the court also
explained, in dicta, that the directive from the Supreme Court’s
Graham decision dealing with patents would “preclude the Congress
from authorizing under [the Patent and Copyright] Clause a copyright
to a work already in the public domain.”137 During oral argument

129. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
130. See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (“The acts of
Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were plainly intended to give
encouragement to the decorative arts. They contemplate not so much utility as appearance . . .
.”).
131. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1168–76 (discussing the Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)).
132. Id. at 1179–81 (discussing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
sec. 514, § 104A(h)(6), 108 Stat. 4809, 4980–81 (1994)).
133. Id. at 1180. This latter assertion was rejected in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217
(2003).
134. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1180.
135. Id. at 1169, 1180.
136. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003).
137. Id. at 377.
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before the Supreme Court, the government conceded as much, noting
that there is a “bright line” between those works with existing
copyrights, which were extended by the CTEA, and other works
138
already in the public domain. When the Supreme Court considered
Eldred, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disregarded any argument that
works could be removed from the public domain, noting that “no one
seriously contends that the Copyright/Patent Clause would authorize
the grant of monopoly privileges for works already in the public
domain.”139 Still, Eldred did not depend upon a determination of this
issue, and when the D.C. Circuit later directly faced this question, it
concluded that the URAA’s granting of copyrights to works already
in the public domain does not violate the Patent and Copyright
140
Clause. Relying on Eldred, that court took the fact that Congress
could extend existing copyrights to mean that Congress would be able
to do the opposite and remove work already within the public
domain.141
When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the application
of the URAA, that court similarly refused to rely on the patent cases,
noting that “[p]atents . . . are not copyrights, and thus patent cases are
142
inapposite to copyright cases.” However, a review of the history of
the Supreme Court’s overlapping treatment of patents and copyrights
clearly illustrates that it is unreasonable for lower courts to conclude
that the limitation on removing works from the public domain is
“inapposite” to copyright.
2. The Graham Rule Applies Equally to Copyrights—The
constitutional copyright provision is found in the same clause as the
constitutional patent provision: “The Congress shall have Power . . .
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
143
Since the very first case
respective Writings and Discoveries.”
interpreting the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court has
relied on a presumption of parallelism between the “Discoveries” of

138. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (October 9, 2002)
(No. 01-618).
139. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
141. Id. at 1263–65.
142. Alameda Films SA de CV v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp. Inc., 331 F.3d 472, 483
n.33 (5th Cir. 2003).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

05__GOODMAN_FINAL.DOC

2008]

CONGRESS CAN’T TRADE AMERICA’S “AIR”

7/23/2008 9:34:33 AM

211

“Inventors” and the “Writings” of “Authors.”144 In Wheaton v. Peters,
the Court faced the question of the correct interpretation of the word
“securing” within the Patent and Copyright Clause.145 Although the
case only pertained to copyrights, the Court reasoned that the word’s
placement within the clause dictated that it “refers to inventors, as
well as authors.”146 The Court then interpreted the word in light of its
147
In subsequent
dual application to both copyrights and patents.
interpretations of the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Court has
maintained the general rule that patents and copyrights are to be
treated the same. For example, in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, the Court
explicitly stated, “[W]hat we have said as to the purposes of the
government in relation to copyrights applies as well, mutatis
mutandis, to patents which are granted under the same constitutional
authority to promote the progress of science and useful arts.”148
Reflecting on over 100 years of precedent in interpreting the Clause,
Justice Douglas once pointed out that “[n]o distinction is made in the
constitutional language between copyrights and patents and I would
not create one by judicial gloss.”149
This is not to say that there are no differences between patents
and copyrights. Even when analogizing between them, the Court has
remained mindful that “[t]he two areas of the law, naturally, are not
identical twins, and we exercise the caution which we have expressed
in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the
other.”150 As evidence of that caution, the Court has pointed to its

144. This parallel structure apparently does not extend to the terms “Science” and “useful
Arts” in the preamble to the Patent and Copyright Clause, as these terms apply to both patent
and copyright. Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 961
(2005) (“The Constitution itself stresses the vital role that copyright plays in advancing the
‘useful Arts.’”) (Breyer, J., concurring) with the title of the first Patent Act, “An Act to promote
the progress of useful Arts.” Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
145. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
146. Id. at 592.
147. Id.
148. 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932). See also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 237 (1964) (“Today we have held in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. that when an article
is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article.”)
(citation omitted); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228, 231 n.7 (1964);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 578 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that,
in previous cases, “the Court repeatedly referred to the patent and copyright statues as if the
same rules of interpretation applied to both”).
149. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
150. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984).
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early decisions in Mazer v. Stein and Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.151 In the
seminal Stein case, the Court refused to apply patent’s “exclusive right
to the art” to copyright.152 As it explained, “The copyright protects
153
originality rather than novelty or invention.” Similarly, in BobbsMerrill, without pointing to any particular difference, the Court noted
only “that there are differences between the patent and copyright
154
statutes in the extent of the protection granted by them.” In Eldred
v. Ashcroft, the Court again exercised this caution, finding that “one
cannot extract from language in our patent decisions . . . genuine
support for petitioners’ bold view . . . that a quid pro quo requirement
stops Congress from expanding copyright’s term in a manner that
puts existing and future copyrights in parity.”155
Importantly, the fact that the Court has described differences
between patents and copyrights does not detract from the general
rule that doctrines based in the Constitution apply equally to both.
Instead, the differences between patent and copyright suggest only
that they be treated differently, when necessary, to reflect inherent
differences about what constitutes a patent or a copyright. Where the
Court has found constitutional differences between patent and
copyright, these differences are due only to the difference between
the terms “author,” “writings,” “inventor,” and “discoveries.”156 Thus,
the Court’s definitions of an “author” as “he to whom anything owes
its orign [sic]; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science
or literature,”157 and of “writings” as “the literary productions of those
authors, . . . to include all forms . . . by which the ideas in the mind of
158
the author are given visible expression,” dictate the originality
159
requirement of copyright.
Judge Learned Hand summarized

151. Id.
152. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
153. Id. at 218.
154. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 345 (1908).
155. 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003).
156. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (citing with
approval a district court’s observation, in Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 764 (C.C.D. Mass.
1894), that “[t]here is a very broad distinction between what is implied in the word ‘author,’
found in the constitution, and the word ‘inventor.’”).
157. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
158. Id. See also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“[T]he word writings . . .
include[s] . . . only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. . . .
the fruits of intellectual labor.”).
159. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc, 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a
constitutional requirement. . . . [T]he crucial terms ‘authors’ and ‘writings’ . . . presuppose a
degree of originality.”).
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copyright’s originality requirement when he famously declared that
“if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose
anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might
of course copy Keats’s.”160 Similarly, the Court’s understanding of the
meaning of “Inventor” and “Discovery” dictate the novelty
161
The reduced originality versus novelty
requirement of patents.
standard162 explains why patents inherently create a monopoly on
ideas,163 whereas copyright grants a more limited right only to prevent
164
direct copying.
Similarly, the inherent difference between the writings of authors
and discoveries of inventors explains why it is “much more important
that when the supposed author sues for a violation of his copyright,
the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of
thought, and conception of the part of the author should be proved
165
Likewise, these inherent
than in the case of a patent right.”
differences explain why “patent’s quid pro quo is more exacting than
copyright’s.”166 As the Court explained in Eldred, “For the author
seeking copyright protection . . . disclosure is the desired objective, not
167
something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.”
This consideration is inherent in an author’s writing and is not
dictated by differential application of the Patent and Copyright
Clause’s limitations to the two types of works. In fact, the Court has
given no guidance to suggest that any word or phrase of the Patent
and Copyright Clause should have a different meaning depending
upon whether it is applied to patents or copyrights. In Justice

160. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
161. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc. 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the word
‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a
physical embodiment of that idea.”). See also Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis Bournonville Co.
270 U.S. 390, 400 (1926) (“[O]ne really must be the first inventor in order to be entitled to a
patent.”).
162. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (recognizing that unlike a patent “[t]he
copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention”).
163. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 n.22 (2003) (recognizing that patent grants
prevent full use of an inventor’s knowledge whereas a copyright “gives the holder no monopoly
on any knowledge”).
164. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
165. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884).
166. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217 n.22.
167. Id. at 216.
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Douglas’ words, the Court has not distinguished between patents and
copyrights “by judicial gloss.”168
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly—including in a series of recent
cases—referred to holdings pertaining only to patents or to copyrights
to inform its inquiry regarding the other. In Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court applied the patent doctrine of
169
contributory infringement to copyright. Then, in Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Court decided that “[f]or the
same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law
as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too,
is a sensible one for copyright.”170 Most recently, in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court adopted copyright doctrine and
applied it to patents, this time with respect to when an injunction
should be granted in an infringement case.171 In fact, in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, the very case relied upon by those courts which refused to
apply patent doctrine to copyright when they considered the URAA,
the Court noted, “Because the Clause empowering Congress to confer
copyrights also authorizes patents, congressional practice with respect
to patents informs our inquiry.”172 The lower courts have similarly
applied doctrines from patent law to copyright.173
Specifically with respect to the removal of works from the public
domain, the parallelism between patent and copyright has already
been applied to the powers of authors and the states. It is clear that
authors, like inventors, cannot remove work from the public
174
domain. Similarly, the limitation preventing the states from granting
patents to works in the public domain is equally applicable to
copyright, as evidenced by the Court’s reference to both in the

168. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
169. 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (“The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright
law.”).
170. 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
171. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
172. 537 U.S. 186, 201 (2003).
173. E.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990) (“We are
persuaded, however, that a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as
a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law.”).
174. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“[O]nce
the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will
and without attribution.”); Steward v Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990) (noting that a work can
be infringed only “[s]o long as the pre-existing work remains out of the public domain”); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
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Compco decision.175 That Congress would similarly be precluded is
reasonable in light of the parallel structure in the Patent and
Copyright Clause and the Court’s continued application of each word
in the Clause to both forms of intellectual property in like manner. In
contrast to the suggestion that copyright in public domain work
should be available where patents clearly are not, a former member of
the Court suggested that if there are differences between patents and
copyright, “a copyright may have to meet greater constitutional
standards for validity than a patent.”176
Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to the application
of the patent cases to copyright, including Graham’s proclamation, the
Supreme Court had already concluded that Congress may not use the
Patent and Copyright Clause to remove works from the public
domain nearly a century before Graham.177 When the Court first
considered the constitutionality of trademarks in the Trade-Mark
Cases, it had the opportunity to consider the application of the Patent
and Copyright Clause to that form of intellectual property.178 While
the case is primarily remembered for the notion that Congress could
not grant trademark protection under the Patent and Copyright
Clause,179 often overlooked is that the Court’s conclusion that
trademarks could not be justified under the Patent and Copyright
Clause also relied on the fact that trademarks were “the adoption of
something already in existence.”180 Importantly, unlike in Graham,
this is a direct reference both to copyright as well as to patent.181 As
the Court did not distinguish between the two in terms of what they
require in this regard, the holding necessarily represents a limitation
of both the Patent and the Copyright Clauses; a limitation that has
neither been contravened nor overruled.
175. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
176. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
177. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
178. Id.
179. Heald & Sherry, supra note 3, at 1156 (“Congress had no power under the Intellectual
Property Clause to protect trademarks, because they are not ‘a sudden invention’ and require
‘no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.’”) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. at 94).
180. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
181. The Court explained, for example, “[i]f we should endeavor to classify it under the
head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to inventions,
originality is required.” Id. at 94. The Court concluded that “we are unable to see any such
power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and
discoveries.” Id. at 95.
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CONCLUSION
182
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act is an
unconstitutional application of the copyright power granted to
Congress. In the name of international trade, Congress has granted
foreign entities American copyrights, circumventing the Constitution’s
mandate that copyrights be granted solely to “Authors.” Courts asked
to review this statute should also pay close attention to the Supreme
Court’s long history of analogous treatment of patents and copyrights.
Absent contrary indication from the Supreme Court, courts should
apply the general rule that doctrine grounded in either of the two
halves of the Patent and Copyright Clause applies equally to the
other half. With respect to the URAA, this doctrine mandates that
Congress may not remove works from the public domain, as they
have done under section 514.
Today, the promotion of international trade has become a
dominant force in domestic policy debates, and the URAA is just one
development, albeit an important one, in this movement.183 The policy
considerations being discussed during passage of the U.S.
184
Just a
Constitution, were very different, however, even opposite.
few years ago, Professor Graeme Austin asked whether the Patent
185
and Copyright Clause mandated isolationism. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the Court answered the question, in part and in the negative, by
deferring to the international concerns prompting Congress to enact
the CTEA.186 However, this should not be taken as granting Congress
a blank check to rely on international trade concerns without limit.
Congress’ ability to bring the United States into line with
international norms is nonetheless constrained by a Constitution,
which does in fact mandate some degree of isolationism. As Professor
Austin recognized, while international law issues were not necessarily
raised under the CTEA, some international questions are inherent in

182. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. 4809,
4976–81 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A).
183. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Work for America, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2006/
asset_upload_file920_9647.pdf.
184. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
185. Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 17, 59 (2002) (cautioning against “an isolationist reading of the Copyright Clause that is
in tension with . . . America’s international copyright relations over the last hundred or so
years”).
186. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003).
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the URAA.187 It does not conflict with Professor Austin’s broad
conclusion that “emerging international intellectual property norms
might be allowed at least to influence thinking about doctrinal
positions as well as fundamental principles in U.S. copyright
jurisprudence,”188 to recognize that in some respects, the Constitution
is unyielding. As the Court has described, the Constitution “sets forth,
and rests upon, innovative principles original to the American
experience.”189 Though some of the Constitution’s limitations may
appear to be outdated today, they must nonetheless be respected. The
challenge for Congress today is to find a way to meet our
international obligations without trading American “air.”

187. Austin, supra note 185, at 20.
188. Id. at 58–59.
189. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).

